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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In these consolidated cases, Edward L. Comer appeals from his judgments of 
conviction for three counts of sex abuse of a child under the age of sixteen.  Mr. Comer 
was found guilty following a jury trial and the district court imposed sentences of ten 
years, with four years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction.  Mr. Comer appeals and 
he asserts that the district court erred by determining, through Rule 404(b) motions, that 
the allegations in these two cases constituted a common scheme or plan and then erred 
by joining the cases on that basis.    
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In docket number 43718, Mr. Comer was charged on October 24, 2013, with two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years.  (R., p.68.)  Count I 
alleged that Mr. Comer committed sexual abuse by touching and/or poking the breasts 
of K.F., who was eleven years old.  (R., p.69.)  Count II alleged that Mr. Comer 
committed sexual abuse by touching and/or poking the K.F.’s vagina.  (R., p.69.)  
Mr. Comer initially pleaded guilty to two counts of injury to a child, but he later withdrew 
his plea.  (R., pp.98, 103.)   
 On September 30, 2014, the State filed a motion to admit 404(b) evidence in the 
form of testimony from S.S., who asserted that “the defendant also has sexual contact 
with her and touched her breasts and vagina.”  (R., p.186.)   
 In docket number 43719, Mr. Comer was charged on December 4, 2014, with 
two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen.  (R., p.583.)  Count I 
alleged that Mr. Comer committed sexual abuse by touching the breasts of S.S., who 
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was ten years old.  (R., p.583-84.)  Count II alleged that Mr. Comer committed sexual 
abuse by touching S.S.’s vagina.  (R., p.584.)   
 On March 2, 2015, the district court granted the State’s 404(b) motion in docket 
number 43718.  (R., p.280.)  The court summarized K.F.’s allegations as follows:  On 
April 24, 2013, a detective was contacted by K.F.’s father, who reported that K.F. had 
informed a counsel that she had been touched inappropriately by Mr. Comer.  
(R., p.281.)  According to K.F., she had stayed at S.S.’s house and Mr. Comer, who is 
S.S.’s uncle, approached her from behind while she was working on a jigsaw puzzle.  
(R., p.280.)  K.F. claimed that Mr. Comer put his hands under her shirt and touched her 
breasts and then he ran his hands over her sides and slid one of them under the front of 
her shorts, poking her vagina over the top of her underwear.  (R., p.282.)  She initially 
said that S.S. was asleep, but later stated that S.S. was in the bathroom.  (R., p.282.)  
Mr. Comer acknowledged that he may have accidentally touched K.F.’s breasts while 
teaching K.F. and S.S. self-defense techniques for protection against bullies.  
(R., p.282.)1    
 In support of its 404(b) motion, the State submitted the affidavit of S.S., which 
generally averred that Mr. Comer had also touched her inappropriately on her breasts 
and vaginal area, and that this sometimes happened while K.F. was present but usually 
it occurred when she and Mr. Comer were alone.  (Affidavit of S.S.)2  The district court 
                                            
1 These facts appear to come from the presentence investigation report that was 
prepared after Mr. Comer pleaded guilty to injury to a child.  No objection was made 
regarding the State’s assertions of fact in the 404(b) motion.   
2 A motion to augment the record with S.S.’s affidavit is being filed contemporaneously 
with this Appellant’s Brief.   
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ruled that S.S.’s allegation would be admissible as 404(b) evidence as both evidence of 
absence of mistake and of a common scheme or plan.  (R., p.280.)   
 The State then filed a 404(b) motion in docket number 43719, and requested that 
evidence of K.F.’s allegations be admissible in S.S.’s trial.  (R., p.603.)  The State 
submitted an affidavit of K.F. in support of the motion, which generally averred that 
Mr. Comer walked up behind her and rubbed her breasts and vagina.  (R., p.615.)  The 
district court granted the State’s motion for the same reason that it granted the motion in 
docket number 43718.  (Tr., p.71, L.9 – p.72, L.21.)   
 The State went to trial in docket number 43719 first, and the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict on Count I and found Mr. Comer not guilty on Count II.  (R., p.743.)  The 
State then moved to consolidate the two cases.  (R., p.391.)  The district court granted 
the State’s motion, stating, “I do think that the best thing to do here is to consolidate 
these two cases.  I do think it’s the same witnesses.  It’s the same fact pattern.  It’s the 
same time, event.  I’m going to let the one victim, alleged victim, testify in the other case 
anyway because I’ve already made that ruling.  So I am going to consolidate the two 
cases.”  (Tr., p.134, Ls.8-14.)   
 Mr. Comer then proceeded to trial in both cases and was found guilty of the three 
remaining counts of sexual abuse.  (R., p.478.)  The district court imposed sentences of 
ten years, with four years fixed, on each count, and the court retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.507, 802.)  Mr. Comer appealed.  (R., pp.515, 810.)  On appeal, he asserts that 
the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to consolidate the two cases for 




Did the district court err when it determined through Rule 404(b) motions that the 
allegations in these two cases constituted a common scheme or plan, and by joining the 
cases on that basis? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Determined Through The Rule 404(b) Motions That 
The Allegations In These Two Cases Constituted A Common Scheme Or Plan And By 





 Mr. Comer asserts that the district court erred by determining in the Rule 404(b) 
motions that the allegations in these two cases constituted a common scheme or plan 
and then by joining the cases on that basis.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of 
law, over which this Court exercises free review.  State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564 
(2007).  A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error 
shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State 
shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). 
 
C. The Allegations In This Case Do Not Constitute A Common Scheme Or Plan 
 
Mr. Comer submits that in both the 404(b) motions and in the motion to 
consolidate, the district court incorrectly determined that the allegations in this case 
constituted a common scheme or plan. 
After the first trial involving S.S., the State moved to consolidate both cases for 
trial.  At the hearing, the State asserted,  
At this point in time, your Honor, we would like to consolidate both of these 
two cases.  The reason being is that we have essentially a huge overlap in 
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what’s going on:  You’ve got the same defendant, a lot of the same 
witnesses, similar type of crime.   
 
Essentially, for judicial efficiency we believe that it would be in the best 
interest of the Court to have both trials consolidated together because 
we’re essentially going to have all of the same people for both trials.  For 
judicial efficiency we would request that the Court consolidate these two 
cases for that purpose. 
 
(Tr., p.128, Ls.7-24.)  Counsel for Mr. Comer responded,  
First of all, Your Honor, as to the motion to consolidate, we would certainly 
argue strongly against such consolidation.  The Court’s very familiar with 
the case that was tried as to the alleged victim with the SS initials.  And in 
that particular case, the Court allowed 404(b) evidence in.  If the other 
case goes to trial, the Court’s going to allow that.  So I think any evidence 
relative to another victim could possible come in in that fashion. 
 
But to actually try the cases themselves together, I don’t agree with 
counsel that they’re similar witnesses, similar facts.  You know, there’s 
some general similarities, but I think specifically they are different.  The 
witnesses are different.  And I think that given the outcome of the first trial, 
I think it’s an effort to now try and simply complicate the matter in terms of 
defending as to both these alleged victims in the same trial.  And I think it 
causes an insurmountable task for the defendant to overcome what can 
come of that or could come of it in terms of how the jury would perceive 
the evidence in trying together.   
 
So I would suggest to the Court that it’d be extremely prejudicial to the 
defendant.  The Court – again, I don’t think there’s any reason for judicial 
economy.  If these cases are tried, they’re going to take a couple days 
each, if not just a day and a half as before.  And I don’t think that’s an 
adequate argument here for the court to consolidate and create a situation 
where there could be a great injustice to the defendant.   
 
(Tr., p.131, L.24 - p.133, L.3.)   
 The district court ruled as follows:  “I do think that the best thing to do here is to 
consolidate these two cases.  I do think it’s the same witnesses.  It’s the same fact 
pattern.  It’s the same time, event.  I’m going to let the one victim, alleged victim, testify 
in the other case anyway because I’ve already made that ruling.  So I am going to 
consolidate the two cases.”  (Tr., p.134, Ls.8-14.)  Thus, the court concluded that, 
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because it had already determined that the alleged victims could testify in the other 
case, and because there was overlap of witnesses, that consolidation was appropriate.  
Mr. Comer submits that the district court erred.    
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho 
Criminal Rules.  Field, 144 Idaho at 565; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 790 (Ct. App. 
2007).  Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may order two or more 
informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single 
information.  I.C.R. 13.  Two or more offenses may be charged in the same information 
if the offenses, “are based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” 
I.C.R. 8(a).  Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient nexus between 
them in order to be properly joined.  State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 358, 361-362 
(Ct. App. 2003).  Whether the initial joinder was proper depends upon what is alleged by 
the State, not what the proof at trial ultimately shows.  Field, 144 Idaho at 565 (quoting 
State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975).  Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a 
defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as 
corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists.  State v. Wilbanks, 
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).  Similarly, rule of evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of 
other acts, while generally inadmissible, can be admissible as evidence of a common 
scheme or plan.  IRE 404(b).   
Mr. Comer maintains that the court erred by determining that alleged offense 
offenses were part of a common plan or scheme.  Mr. Comer submits that this case is 
controlled by the recent decision in State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757 (2015).  In 
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Orellana-Castro, Mr. Orellana-Castro was charged with unlawful sexual contact with his 
two stepdaughters.  Id. 158 at 759.  The State moved for joinder, and the district court 
found that the evidence showed a common scheme or plan where:  (1) the two girls 
were defendant’s step-daughters; (2) they were close in age; (3) the abuse allegedly 
occurred in the home; and (4) the alleged incidents occurred during a two-year period.  
Id. 158 Idaho at 762.  The district court found the two girls involved different types of 
sexual abuse—genital contact versus touching, but that the difference was insufficient 
to indicate a lack of a common scheme or plan.  Id. 
However, the Orellana-Castro Court faulted the district court for failing to conduct 
the analysis mandated by the Court in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009) and State v. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010) —“a common scheme or plan must embrace the 
commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to 
establish the other.”  Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762 (emphasis in original).  The 
Court held that the district court abused its discretion for failing to conduct the requisite 
analysis.  Id.  The Orellana-Castro Court also held that the jury instruction charging the 
jury with deciding each count separately was insufficient to alleviate the prejudice from 
improper joinder.  Id.  In analyzing whether the error was harmless, the Court first noted 
that there was no physical evidence corroborating the girls’ testimony.  Id.  The Court 
found there was a risk that evidence from one girl would convince the jury of the 
defendant’s propensity to engage in sexual molestation when evaluating evidence 
regarding the other girl or her credibility.  Id. at 763.  Thus, the existence of two 
accusers would enhance their credibility, and even a jury instruction cautioning against 
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considering such evidence as probative of propensity would have been insufficient to 
prevent such an error from prejudicing the defendant.  Id. 
In State v. Grist, Mr. Grist was alleged to have sexually abused his live-in 
girlfriend’s daughter from when she was ten years old until she graduated from high 
school.  Id. at 50-51.  He was alleged to have had her sit on his lap and touched her 
breasts, buttocks and vagina.  Id.  Mr. Grist’s ex-wife’s daughter testified that she lived 
with Mr. Grist when she was eight until she was thirteen and he would have her sit on 
his lap or lay down with him and he would touch her breasts and buttocks.  Id.  The 
Grist Court held that evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts “may be admissible ‘if 
relevant to prove . . . a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or 
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other.’”  Id. 
at 54-55 (emphasis in original).  The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment of 
conviction in Grist, holding the trial court had not conducted the proper analysis 
regarding the admissibility of evidence of Mr. Grist’s prior bad acts admitted to prove a 
common scheme or plan.  Id. at 55. 
Similarly, in Johnson, this Court found 404(b) error because the similarities in the 
alleged incidents were “far too unremarkable to demonstrate a ‘common scheme or 
plan’ in the defendant’s behavior.”  See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669.  In Johnson the 
Court explained that “at a minimum,” this rule requires, “evidence of a common scheme 
or plan beyond the bare fact that” the defendant has committed the same kind of 
misconduct in the past. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. The Court continued, stating that 
“[t]he events must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing 
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a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same 
person committed all the acts.” Id. (citations omitted).  
In Johnson, the defendant was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen and the Court held that the district court erred in admitting evidence the 
defendant had abused his sister when she was about the same age as the victim in the 
charged offense. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. The Court found similarities in the charged 
and uncharged incidents (victims were both young girls about the same age, both 
victims were younger members of the defendant’s family for whom the defendant was 
an “authority figure,” and in both cases, the abuse took the same form) to be “far too 
unremarkable to demonstrate a ‘common scheme or plan’ in the defendant’s behavior.” 
Id. The Court clarified that evidence showing only “generalized similarities,” between 
charged and uncharged conduct, such as the victim’s sex or age, or the means by 
which a defendant gains access to them “is more accurately described as inadmissible 
evidence merely demonstrating the defendant’s predisposition for opportunistically 
molesting children.” Id. at 669 n. 5 (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 54).  Therefore, to be 
admissible under Rule 404(b), “evidence of prior misconduct must show more than a 
superficial similarity to the nature and details of the charged conduct, but must instead 
show that the defendant’s charged and uncharged conduct is linked in a way that 
permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct 
leading up to the charged offense.”  State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8-11 (2013).   
Applying Grist, Johnson, and Orellana-Castro to the facts of his case, Mr. Comer 
asserts that the result must be the same—a finding that the charges do not constitute a 
common scheme or plan.  In this case, the allegations do not show such a plan.  The 
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evidence, if believed, would only tend to demonstrate Mr. Comer’s predisposition for 
opportunistically molesting children.  See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669 n.5.  While K.F. 
and S.S. were close in age the alleged abuse occurred in the same time period, this 
does not demonstrate a common scheme or plan.  K.F.’s affidavit averred that the 
alleged abuse occurred when S.S. was either in the bathroom or while asleep.  
(R., p.615.)  S.S. averred that most of the inappropriate touching occurred while K.F. 
was away.  (Affidavit of S.S.)  Thus, the evidence shows only that Mr. Comer possibly 
engaged in opportunistic conduct.  Nothing in the allegations demonstrates the 
existence of a scheme where the acts are so similar that proof of one tends to prove the 
other.   As such, Mr. Comer submits that the district court erred by finding evidence of a 
common scheme or plan at both the Rule 404(b) motions and in the motion to 
consolidate.   
 Mr. Comer acknowledges that the district court also held that the 404(b) evidence 
was relevant to show absence of mistake due to the fact that Mr. Comer had asserted 
that any touching was accidental.  (R., p.287.).  However, the standard for joining cases 
is not whether certain evidence would be admissible as absence of mistake.  The only 
test is whether the evidence constitutes a common scheme or plan.  Nor does the 
court’s conclusions regarding absence of mistake render the decision to join the cases 
harmless.  In fact, the record conclusively demonstrates the opposite.  During S.S.’s first 
trial, which occurred pre-joinder (and where K.F. testified), the jury acquitted Mr. Comer 
of one charge and failed to reach a conclusion on the other.  (R., p.743; 759.)  Thus, 
Mr. Comer asserts it is impossible for the State to show that the district court’s error was 
 12 
harmless because the record already demonstrates that it is possible for a jury to come 
to a different conclusion where one of the alleged victims offers 404(b) evidence. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Comer requests that his convictions be vacated and his cases remanded for 
further proceedings. 
 DATED this 7th day of November, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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